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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ONLY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALLSTATE AND 
WONG IS THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ITSELF. 
The arbitration agreement between Wong and Allstate was the arbitration agreement. Allstate 
attempts to expand the arbitration agreement to include the insurance policy by stating that "the 
parties entered into a series of agreements." This overlooks the fact that the arbitration agreement 
is a document complete on its face. Whether there were other prior agreements between the parties 
is irrelevant. Presumably, every time parties submit a contractual dispute to arbitration, there are 
prior contracts. The arbitrator and the courts do not have a green light to review the entire contractual 
history of the parties based upon the fact that the parties entered into a series of agreements. See e.g., 
Cade v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1998)(refusing to incorporate other 
contracts between parties into unambiguous agreement to arbitrate securities claims only). Only if 
the ultimate agreement, the arbitration agreement, is ambiguous, is there justification for considering 
extrinsic evidence, which might include prior contractual agreements. Allstate has never offered any 
argument that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous. In fact, the word "ambiguity" does not 
appear in Allstate's brief or the trial court's ruling. 
The fact that the arbitration agreement did not place an upper limit or cap on the arbitrator's 
award does not make the agreement "capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.'" SME Indus., Inc. v. 
Thompson, Ventulett, Stainbach & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, P14, 28 P.3d 669, at f 14 (quoting 
2 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp. ,813 P.2d 104,108 (Utah 1991)(further quotation omitted)), as quoted in 
WebBankv. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f20; see also Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 
2002 UT 43 at f 19,48 P.3d 918; Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42 at f9,48 P.3d 941; Cent. 
Fla. Invests., Inc. v. ParkwestAssocs., 2002 UT 3 at f 12, 40 P.3d 599. The trial court and Allstate 
implicitly concede as much by failing to assert such an ambiguity. 
Allstate attempts to end-run the unambiguous arbitration agreement by attempting to make 
the agreement hiring Mr. Driggs into the arbitration agreement. This short form, filled out to hire Mr. 
Driggs, is not the arbitration agreement. The agreement to hire an arbitrator is a collateral document, 
and ordinarily would not modify the scope or terms of the master arbitration agreement. Even if it 
were to be read in pari materia with the arbitration agreement, the agreement hiring Mr. Driggs does 
not contain any limitation on his authority to make an award. 
Allstate and the trial court evaded the clear, unambiguous arbitration agreement by 
incorporating the insurance policy declarations sheet by reference. There was no legal justification 
for this incorporation by reference. Wong will even concede (for this appeal only) that an arbitration 
agreement might be read in pari materia with an insurance policy where arbitration is required by 
the policy to resolve disputes. But this arbitration was not required by the Allstate policy. There is 
no evidence in the record that the insurance policy ever references arbitration, let alone requires it 
for any sort of insurance benefit. See Cade v. lions First Nat. Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 
1998)(refusing to incorporate employment agreement into arbitration agreement, where employment 
agreement failed to mention or require arbitration). Wong is simply baffled as to how Allstate 
believes it can unilaterally import a prior document into an unambiguous agreement to arbitrate. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO 
CONCLUDE THAT THE ARBITRATOR HAD EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY. 
Allstate argues that Wong waived his right to object to the admission of the adjuster affidavit. 
Allstate overlooks the difference between admission of an exhibit, and giving any legal weight to 
that exhibit. Whether the adjuster's affidavit was properly filed with the court or not, the trial court 
erred by considering it. Wong strenuously objected to the trial court relying upon the affidavit to 
modify the award, even though he did not move to strike the affidavit. 
For instance, the unilateral expectations of an insured in Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 839 P2d 798 (Utah 1992) were a part of the record before the lower court and on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court accorded them NO weight in rejecting a doctrine of "reasonable 
expectations". 
The error of the trial court is stark when considering the converse situation. For example, 
suppose that the arbitrator awarded Wong nothing. What if Wong then submitted an affidavit that 
he thought he had a guaranteed minimum "low" of $10,000.00 in the arbitration? Would the court 
rely upon Wong's affidavit to change the clear terms of the arbitration agreement which did not 
contain a "low" agreement? Would that justify the court setting aside the arbitrator's award, and 
giving Wong $10,000.00? Wong is confident that the court would tell him to simply live with the 
clear terms of his arbitration agreement. A party cannot change the clear, unambiguous terms of an 
agreement simply by placing an inconsistent affidavit in the court file. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING A "REASONABLE 
EXPECTATIONS" DOCTRINE IN FAVOR OF ALLSTATE 
Allstate also makes the argument, in various ways, that enforcing the full amount of the 
award would violate the "reasonable expectations of the parties".1 Wong replies that his reasonable 
expectation is that the court will enforce the clear, literal, unambiguous terms of the arbitration 
agreement. Allen v. Prudential Prop, & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P2d 798 (Utah 1992). 
IV. THERE WERE NO OTHER EQUITABLE DOCTRINES TO JUSTIFY IGNORING 
THE UNAMBIGUOUS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
The trial court was clearly hung up on why Allstate would agree to an arbitration without a 
high/low agreement in place. The first response is it simply isn't the trial court's problem to answer 
that question. Whether it was a good idea or bad idea to arbitrate on the terms of the agreement, the 
courts are bound to enforce the agreement as written. This rule is regularly enforced against 
consumers; one could ask why a consumer would agree to arbitrate under the terms of many common 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts. However unfair the arbitration agreement may seem 
to the consumer, if they signed the agreement to arbitrate, the agreement is enforced. But what is 
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If arbitration agreements are enforceable against 
consumers without regard to their advisability or fairness, they ought to be equally enforceable 
!The about-face of this argument is breath-taking. Allstate regularly urges courts to ignore 
the "reasonable expectations" of its insureds in favor of enforcement of the literal terms of an 
insurance policy. 
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against a billion-dollar insurance company represented by counsel.2 
Allstate dresses the "unfair result" argument in different clothing, accusing Wong of "unclean 
hands", by attempting to take advantage of confusion he created. Allstate makes no legal analysis 
of this equitable doctrine. But further, Wong does not believe he created any confusion. He believes 
that the agreement was clear. His attorney was very clear before the arbitration as to how Wong read 
the agreement to arbitrate. The high/low was removed by interlineation, and was clearly obvious to 
Allstate's counsel, prior to Allstate agreeing to the arbitration. Allstate could have sought judicial 
relief in the face of its disagreement. It did not, and gambled that the arbitration would go favorably 
to it. Wong acted in good faith, being up front about his position at all times. 
CONCLUSION 
Allstate treated Wong badly; it was dismissive of his injuries and refused to negotiate in good 
faith with him. It blindly assumed that the arbitrator's award would not exceed policy limits. It also 
appears that it attempted to innoculate its course of conduct toward Wong by agreeing to an open-
ended arbitration agreement. Having gambled badly on arbitration, Allstate should be forced to live 
with the results of its agreement. 
This appeal presents the Court with the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to 
principle and process over result. Contracts are enforced according to their terms as a matter of 
2
 As counsel for insureds and/or consumers generally, Wong's attorneys would welcome 
a rule that allowed a trial court the freedom to review an arbitration agreement for fairness or 
reasonability, without regard to the actual terms of the agreement. 
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principle. The Court does not start with a perceived desirable result, and work backwards. The 
Courts regularly tell insureds that it enforces insurance contracts according to their terms, despite 
what may seem to be an unfair or harsh result. Integrity would demand that the Court tell Allstate 
the same thing. Any other decision will demonstrate an inconsistent approach to enforcement of 
contracts, favoring insurers and disfavoring insureds. 
Looking at this case even more broadly, the clear thrust of both legislative and judicial work 
over the past decade has been to strengthen the arbitration (and ADR) process generally. The most 
important statement the Court can make is one that affirms the integrity of the arbitration process, 
and resists the urge to make it even better by judicial review of perceived unfair results. The result 
in this case only concerns Wong and Allstate. But the principle of respecting arbitrator's awards is 
critically important in the ongoing development of alternative dispute resolution in Utah concerns 
all litigants and society as a whole. The arbitrator's award should be re-instated. 
DATED this / day of November, 2003. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant Wong 
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